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A complete analysis of a story's structure must rely on more than a simple grammar of story components; it requires a consideration of the characters' plans as they are stated or implied in the story.
Furthermore, it must be recognized that these plans are characters' beliefs, and that beliefs about interactions among plans are crucial determinants of a story's structure. A notation system for representing interacting plans is presented here and applied to a simple children's tale about a fox and a rooster. Various phenomena that appear in this story are described. For example, a character in conflict with another may try to conceal his or her real plans or try to deceive the other character into acting in a way that serves his or her own interest at the other's expense. A character may thus construct a plan that is intended to be believed by the other, but is not actually carried out. Such a virtual plan plays a central role in the fox and rooster story and is common in other stories in which characters interact.
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Telling a story may be the most powerful way to communicate an idea. An artful recounting of events not only reveals much about the people involved, but also triggers generalizations that reach far beyond the story itself. It is not surprising then that numerous theories have arisen to explain the structure of stories and how people understand them.
This paper is concerned with the processes of story comprehension, in particular, with the use of structured knowledge in building an interpretation of a story. Since the approach taken here differs significantly from what has traditionally fallen under the label "analysis of the structure of narratives" it may be useful to show how it fits into a scheme of ways to study narratives.
The most popular approach to analysis of narrative structure in current psychology research literature is the story grammar approach. Using this approach researchers observe that the setting of a story is usually in the beginning, that episodes within the story themselves have internal structure, and so on. This is exemplified by (among many others) Propp (1958) in his analysis of Russian folk tales, and more recently by the work of cognitive psychologists such as Rumelhart (1975) , Mandler and Johnson (1977) , Sutton-Smith, Botvin, and Mahoney (1976) , Stein and Glenn (1978) , and Thorndyke (1977) . Glossing over, for the moment, important differences in structural Analysis of Interacting Plans 3 analyses of this sort, we can say that they do capture important regularities in story structure. For example, they can be used to describe differences in the folk tales of different cultures, or to describe developmental levels of story understanding.
What a story grammar approach fails to capture is the fact that episodic structure is typically produced by interactions among characters attempting to achieve goals. Any purely syntactic approach, which ignores the effect of characters in the story as active agents, will necessarily be incomplete in its account of the story's structure. Specifically, it will miss the underlying connections among syntactic units of the story.
We are thus led to a second approach to the analysis of story structure, one which analyzes characters' goals and plans.
Since we can never know what is in a character's mind, we must infer plans on the basis of the character's actions, statements, and whatever insight the author allows us into his or her mind.
Research on plans in stories (e.g., Wilensky, 1978; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Bruce, 1975, in press ) has moved towards elaboration of the knowledge about plans and goals that a character could be presumed to have in a given situation. This study may lead to a partial explanation for the types of structures that emerge from a story grammar. Cohen, 1978) . This makes possible things such as virtual plans, e.g., a plan that P intends for Q to believe that P has, but that P does not intend to carry out.
Analysis of Interacting Plans
The facts that plans of characters in stories are interdependent, that actions are based on beliefs, and that beliefs are recursive lead to our third approach. The analysis of interacting or social plans (as in Bruce & Newman, 1978) thus becomes necessary for the complete analysis of story structure.
This paper discusses such an approach and applies it in the analysis of a simple children's story.
The first section below gives a brief overview of the basic concepts and the notation system to be used. (1) The discussion to follow assumes a two character narrative; the notation can be generalized for more characters. A full catalogue of the elements and other details of the notation system can be found in Bruce and Newman (1978 Returning to Figure 1 , we can see that the central area is a mutual belief space. In fact, it is also a social episode space; it contains beliefs of the participants that they are Of" indicates that an intention is carried out by an act;
"Produces" indicates that a state (or states) causes another state; and "Has Effect" indicates that an act has a given state as its outcome.
Fig 2. Initiation of a social episode. P and Q are the two participants in the social episode.
The embedded ovals represent intentions to achieve (A) or to maintain (M) some state, including, possibly, some other intention.
The square box represents the utterance P uses to initiate the episode. One of these beliefs is that the initiation act is precisely that: an act to create the mutual belief space in which it resides.
Given the elements for representing basic plans, i. The rooster said, "Let us stay here all night. I will sleep in this tree-top. You can sleep in the hollow trunk." 4.
"Very well," said the dog. 5. So the dog and the rooster went to sleep. 6.
In the morning the rooster began to crow, "Cock-a-doodle-do! Cock-a-doodle-do!" 7.
Mr. Fox heard him crow. 8.
He said, "That is a rooster crowing. He must be lost in the woods.
I will eat him for my breakfast." 9.
Soon Mr. Fox saw the rooster in the tree-top. 10. He said to himself, "Ha! ha! Ha! ha! What a fine breakfast I shall have! I must make him come down from the tree. Ha! ha! Ha! ha!" 11. So he said to the rooster, "What a fine rooster you are! How well you sing! Will you come to my house for breakfast?" 12. The rooster said, "Yes, thank you, I will come, if my friend may come, too." 13. "Oh yes," said the fox. "I will ask your friend.
Where is he?" 14. The rooster said, "My friend is in this hollow tree.
He is asleep.
You must wake him" 15. Mr. Fox said to himself, "Ha! ha! I shall have two roosters for my breakfast!" 16. So he put his head into the hollow tree. 17. Then he said, "Will you come to my house for breakfast?" 18. Out jumped the dog and caught Mr. Fox by the nose.
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We will examine the portion of the story (lines 8 through 15) wherein the fox attem'pts to lure the rooster down from the tree.
There are three levels to the analysis. First, there is the surface interaction --two characters arranging a social engagement. Second, there is the fox's real plan, in which he makes use of familiar social conventions to attain his ulterior goals. Third, there is the rooster's real plan, a double deception, which plays upon both the conventional plan and the fox's poorly hidden plan.
In the process of considering these different levels of plans (and beliefs about plans) we need to observe the structure of the plans, but more importantly, how the various plans interact.
The Surface Interaction
In nearly every interesting story there are. interactions among characters occurring at multiple levels. An analysis of story structure should reflect the different levels of interaction, partly because each level may be important by itself to an understanding of the story, but also because characters can use shared understandings at one level to achieve goals at a deeper level.
In our example story, the fox uses a shared understanding about the social conventions surrounding the breakfast invitation to mask his real plan to devour the rooster.
Similarly, the rooster relies on these shared beliefs to mask his real plan (to stay alive) and to pretend to be deceived. Thus, while the surface level interaction "having breakfast together" is a goal of neither the fox nor the rooster, we need to understand what each of the protagonists believes about the interaction in order to see the form of their real plans.
The surface level interaction is important in another sense.
In order for a character to carry out one plan while appearing to do another, he or she must ensure that the virtual plan mimics ordinary social reality as closely as possible. Our study of a virtual plan thus becomes a study of the forms of ordinary social interaction. Most of the comments on the form of a virtual plan will necessarily extend to general social interaction.
In "The Fox and the Rooster," much of the interaction is built around the "breakfast" episode. As mentioned above, this episode is never accomplished and never intended to be accomplished by either participant, but if it were carried out, it would have the form as shown in way, and second, that he is suggesting a modification to the episode that is compatible with its detailed structure. In Figure 4 , we can see that the rooster has, by his utterance, put himself in the "someone" slot and then altered the episode to include his friend. The episode shown in Figure 4 is simply an elaboration of that shown in Figure 3 . The rooster does not appear to disturb the fox's basic plan. In particular, he does not disturb the outcome desired by the fox, i.e., "R with F" (or rooster with fox).
In the figure, all the boxes except one are dashed, indicating that those acts are not intended to be executed. The one box labeled " leave tree" and the oval labeled "
with F" are solid, indicating that the act of leaving the tree in order to be with the fox is part of the fox's real plan. In fact, this act is part of both his real plan and his virtual plan. The virtual plan is constructed around it to make it appear less dangerous than it really is. 
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they are doing these actions. This pictorial simplification was done to highlight the sequence of (virtual) actions. In subsequent diagrams we will need to look more closely at the specific intentions of the fox, and then the rooster, for the story moves, not by the virtual actions, nor even by the real actions alone, but by the conflicting intentions of the characters. Fig. 4 . The breakfast plan as modified by the rooster. The subscripts mark the temporal order for the acts..
In the fox's real plan only acts t1 through t6 are expected to be done; in the rooster's real plan only acts tl through t5 are expected.
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The Fox's Plan: Deception
The fox wants to have a breakfast, not with the rooster, but of the rooster.
As one ten year old explained, "He's going to be the breakfast!" How does the fox get the rooster to cooperate and come down from the tree? His plan is simple: make the rooster believe that the fox is friendly and that it is all right to engage in an ordinary social interaction with him. The ordinary social interaction plan will be virtual, since the fox never intends to carry it out; his real plan is to eat the rooster.
Since the fox is being deceptive, he has both real and virtual intentions.
A diagram of his beliefs shows two complete plans, one real and one virtual, such that the real plan can be overlaid on the virtual plan, matching at crucial points. Each of the other embedded ovals represents an intention of the fox. The embedded ovals represent intentions to achieve (A) a state, intentions to maintain (M) a state, or beliefs (B). The vertical dashed line separates the fox's (F) role in the episode from the rooster's (R).
F HAVERes Specifipeeses
Reading from left to right, we see that the fox's intention to have the rooster for breakfast can be achieved if the rooster is near. This specifies an intention to have the rooster near, which, in turn, specifies another intention, to.get the rooster to want to eat with the fox. This intention to create an intention conveniently happens to be one which is specified by the highest level virtual intention (shown in dashed lines at the far left), namely, that the fox and rooster will eat together.
The coincidence of the real and the virtual plans means that henceforth most of the more specific intentions can serve a dual role; i.e., by furthering the virtual plan they automatically further the real plan. For example, it is appropriate to both the (virtual) breakfast plan and to the (real) eating-rooster plan to invoke a strategy of the following form (cf. For the virtual plan, the act, A, is "eat breakfast with fox."
For the real plan, A is "leave tree" and B is "eat breakfast with fox" (as in Figures 3 and 4) .
To fulfill the virtual plan, the fox needs to convince the rooster that he is friendly.
Since his real plan depends upon fulfillment of the virtual plan, convincing the rooster that he is friendly also helps to fulfill the real plan. Note however, that one intention for the fox, namely, maintaining his role in the episode, must remain simply virtual and not serve a dual role.
The fox's plan is thus a two level interacting plan. At one level he appears to be carrying out the ordinary interaction of inviting someone to breakfast. At a deeper level, he is using the same actions to fulfill his real goal of eating the rooster. These two levels can be explained as existing simultaneously, but in different belief spaces. The breakfast episode, i.e., the ordinary interaction which has a virtual status, is in a mutual belief space. The fox believes that the rooster believes that the episode is legitimate and fully shared. The fox's real plan is, however, (so he believes) known only to himself.
The Rooster's Plan: Double Deception
The rooster does not want to be breakfast. In fact, he probably does not even want to have breakfast with the fox. On the other hand, we may assume that the rooster foresees that a simple refusal on his part will simply force the fox to try another plan. To get rid of the fox permanently the rooster must pretend to be fooled. The rooster, in order to get rid of the fox, must get the fox to modify his plan. But the modification cannot be in terms of the fox's real plan, because the rooster is not supposed to know about that (although he clearly does). Thus the rooster must make the fox modify the surface (virtual) plan in such a way that the real plan will be foiled, all without the fox's suspecting. Fig. 6 . The rooster's real plan. The rooster (R) is attempting a complex deception on the fox (F), which relies on a difference in beliefs about the identity of <FRIEND>.
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ROOSTER CONVINCE FOX THAT ROOSTER IS GULLIBLE ROOSTER CONVINCE FOX THAT <FRIEND> WOULD BE GULLIBLE, TOO
The rooster develops his plan through the involvement of a third character, the dog, but for our purposes here we can consider the dog to be outside of the interactive situation.
In fact, one can assume that the dog knows nothing and bites the fox solely in response to being awakened. To get the dog involved, the rooster needs to get the fox to see an advantage for himself in including the dog. Because the rooster presumably believes that foxes know that dogs are their enemies, he cannot even suggest that the dog is present. Instead, he ) refers to the dog as his "friend," allowing the fox to believe that the friend is another rooster. The fox can then fall into the trap of greed, believing that the plan that is apparently working on rooster number one will work as well on rooster number two.
In Figure 6 , we see that the rooster's intentions are actually intentions to create intentions in the fox, e.g., get the fox to want to eat "friend," then get the fox to want to try the breakfast plan on "friend." Conveniently for the rooster, he can suggest modifications in the fox's basic deceptive plan by the same actions (utterance) he uses to pose as one deceived by the fox's plan. Thus, the rooster is practicing deception on the fox, just as the fox attempts to on the rooster, but he also practices a double deception in that he leads the fox to believe that the rooster has been deceived.
Structure in Terms of Belief Spaces
Consideration of the plans of the characters in even the simple story of the fox and the rooster shows that plans cannot be viewed solely as tree or graph diagrams relating acts, states, intentions, and so on. Instead, they must be seen as belief structures that relate to other belief structures. In every story, a character's plan has to be considered as part of that character's beliefs, or part of another character's beliefs
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about the first character's beliefs, or part of some other belief space.
In fact, we can understand much of a story's structure by the belief space organization without referring to the detailed structure (of acts and states) that is usually considered to be the analysis of a plan.
Let us return to look at Figure 1 Because the fox's deception fails, these beliefs are in fact in RBFB, i.e., the rooster knows the plan, and since the rooster thinks the fox thinks he has fooled the rooster, the plan is not in RBFBRBFB, i.e., the rooster believes that the fox believes that the rooster does not know the fox's real plan.
To the right is the rooster's real plan, the double deception. Since his plan works, these beliefs are only in RB (and not in FBRB).
In order to understand this story, a reader has to keep track of the (changing) belief space organization, marking beliefs as held by rooster, fox, dog, or reader. Since a belief can be about a belief, the reader also has to place each belief in appropriate embedded spaces, say, the rooster's beliefs about the fox's beliefs about the rooster's beliefs (RBFBRB). Such ongoing auditing of beliefs is more than just an interesting game that occurs during reading; in many cases it is the very foundation for understanding the essence of the story.
Author-Reader-Character
Things are never as simple as they seem. 
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believes that the rooster believes that foxes like to eat roosters and that the rooster uses this belief in concocting his plan. Without the critical belief, one could easily arrive at the "dumb rooster" theory about the story, a theory which leads to major differences in the perceived story (although not in the tree structure that would come from a story grammar analysis).
The diagram of the rooster's beliefs under the dumb rooster interpretation is not the complex structure shown in Figure 1 , but simply the structure of coinciding mutual belief.
Differences among readers in their critical beliefs may arise from differing literary experiences or from general cultural differences. We found in protocol analyses of children reading "The Fox and the Rooster" that their experience with fables about foxes affected the way they interpreted the story.
This merely corroborates some more general findings about cross-cultural differences in text comprehension (Bartlett, 1932; Steffensen, Jogdeo, & Anderson, 1978; Kintsch & Greene, 1978 
Conclusion
This paper presents a way to analyze stories that is concerned with (1) the structures that relate actions, utterances, and thoughts of characters, (2) the plans of characters that may be inferred from their actions, and (3) the social and subjective aspects of those plans. By emphasizing the roles of beliefs and interactions among plans, this approach gives a richer and more direct account of story structure than one could obtain by either a purely structural account or a consideration of simple plans.
One might well ask whether the interacting plans approach is then a way to study stories or a way to study story understanding. I would argue that with respect to interacting plans such a distinction is at best tenuous. The processes that a story analyzer needs to engage in happen to be a subset of those that any reader needs to do. Any reader needs to build a Interacting plans analysis is therefore the reader's guide, as well as ours, to understanding the structure of a story.
